Using a comprehensive sample of trades by Schedule 13D filers, who possess valuable private information when they accumulate stocks of targeted companies, this paper studies whether several liquidity measures reveal the presence of informed trading. The evidence suggests that when Schedule 13D filers trade aggressively, both high-frequency and low-frequency measures of stock liquidity indicate a higher stock liquidity. Importantly, measures that have been used as direct proxies for adverse selection, such the Kyle (1985) lambda, the Easley et al. (1996) pin measure, and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, suggest that the adverse selection is lower when informed trading takes place. The evidence is consistent with informed traders being more aggressive when measured stock liquidity is high.
Introduction
An extensive body of theory suggests that stock liquidity, as measured by the spread between the bid and ask quotes and by the price impact of trades, should be informative about the magnitude of asymmetric information between market participants (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988) . For example, in his seminal contribution, Kyle (1985) shows how an insider hides his private information and optimally accumulates shares at a rate inversely proportional to his price impact, 3 Kyle's lambda, which measures the dollar change in price due to a dollar change in order flow. In the cross-section stocks with more informed trading relative to noise trading experience larger price impact.
Specifically, Kyle's lambda, which can be estimated from a regression of price change on order flow, is higher for stocks with more informed trading (relative to liquidity trading).
Following that literature there have been many attempts to measure trading costs empirically, and to decompose such costs into different components such as a adverse selection, order processing cost, and inventory cost (e.g., early papers include Glosten, 1987; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Stoll, 1989; Hasbrouck, 1991; Amihud, 2002 ). An extensive empirical literature relies on adverse selection measures assuming they capture information asymmetry (e.g., Barclay and Hendershott, 2004; Vega, 2006; Duarte et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2009; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2011) .
Do these empirical measures of stock liquidity actually capture information asymmetry?
Most measures rely on some empirical estimate of price impact and its persistence to identify the amount of private information in trades. There is an obvious endogeneity issue with this approach. Ideally, one would want to separate informed from uninformed trades ex-ante, and test their impact on price changes. Unfortunately, since we generally do not know the traders' information sets, this is hard to do in practice. As a result, it is often assumed that some types of investors are informed. For example, Boulatov et al. (2009) use the institutional order flow as a proxy for informed trading.
In this paper, we use a novel data set of trades by investors we can identify as having substantial private information, to study whether proposed liquidity measures reveal the presence of informed trading. Specifically, we exploit a disclosure requirement to identify trades that rely on valuable private information. Rule 13d-1(a) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act requires investors to file with the SEC within 10 days of acquiring more than 5% of any class of securities of a publicly traded company if they have an interest in influencing the management of the company. In particular, Item 5(c) of Schedule 13D
requires the filer to "... describe any transactions in the class of securities reported on that were effected during the past sixty days or since the most recent filing of Schedule 13D, whichever is less." Thus, Schedule 13D filings reveal the date and price at which all trades by the Schedule 13D filer were executed during the 60 days that precede the filing date.
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We hand collect a comprehensive sample of trades from the Schedule 13D filings. We view this sample as an interesting laboratory to study the liquidity and the price impact of informed trades. First, an average Schedule 13D filing in our sample is characterized by a positive and significant market reaction upon announcement. For example, the cumulative return in excess of the market is about 6% in the (t-10,t+1) window around the filing date and about 3% in the (t-1,t+1) window around the filing date. Second, we calculate several measures of profits made by Schedule 13D filers and show that these profits are economically significant. For example, an average Schedule 13D filer gains $1.13 million on a $30 million stake in a $404 million market cap company. Third, we document performance of trading strategies that replicate trades of Schedule 13D filers.
The evidence suggests that these strategies exhibit positive and significant alpha when either one-, three-, or four-factor models are concerned. For example, a trading strategy that replicates trades by Schedule 13D filers exhibits a 0.09% daily alpha in the fourfactor model. To summarize, the evidence implies that Schedule 13D filers' information is valuable. Therefore, we can classify the pre-announcement trades by Schedule 13D filers as informed trades. It is also important to realize that, by its very nature, the information held by Schedule 13D filers is likely to qualify as 'private information.' In most cases, these activist share-holders know they can increase the value of the firm they invest in by their own effort. Their effort level is, of course, conditional on their achieving a large stake in the firm. It is their very actions and share-holdership that constitutes the 'private' information in many cases.
Our main empirical result is that standard liquidity measures do not reveal the presence of informed traders. Instead, we find that standard liquidity measures suggest that a stock is more liquid when there is significant informed trading in that stock.
Specifically, we find that all high-frequency measures of stock liquidity we consider are lower on days on which Schedule 13D filers trade. For example, on an average day when Schedule 13D filers trade, the measured price impact is almost 30% lower relative to the sample average. Similarly to the high-frequency measures, the low-frequency measures of stock liquidity suggest that liquidity is higher when Schedule 13D filers trade. For example, Amihud's illiquidity measure decreases by more than 45% on days when Schedule 13D filers trade. Importantly, we show that days when Schedule 13D filers trade are characterized by positive and significant market-adjusted returns, which suggests that informed trades do impact prices. Liquidity measures, however, fail to detect that price impact.
Importantly, some of the liquidity measures we consider, such as the Kyle (1985) lambda, the Easley et al. (1996) This paper is related to several strands of literatures.
First, this paper contributes to the empirical literature that relies on liquidity measures as a proxy for information asymmetry (e.g, Barclay and Hendershott, 2004; Vega, 2006; Duarte et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2009; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2011) . Our evidence suggests that empirical measures of information asymmetry might not reveal the presence of informed traders. Therefore, empirical researchers should be cautious when relying on a liquidity measure as a proxy for information asymmetry.
Second, our paper is related to the large literature on the estimation of the asymmetric information component of transaction costs (e.g., Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Stoll, 1989; Hasbrouck, 1991; Lin et al., 1995) . In contrast to this literature, our paper does not rely on time-series properties of stock prices to identify informed trades, but uses well-identified trades executed by informed traders to study the impact of asymmetric information on stock price liquidity measures.
Third, our paper is related to the empirical literature that studies the impact of informed trading on the stock liquidity. One strand of this literature studies the impact of share repurchases on stock liquidity and finds mixed results (Barclay and Smith, 1988; Singh et al., 1994; Franz et al., 1995; Miller and McConnell, 1995; Brockman and Chung, 2001; Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007) . Another strand of this literature studies the impact of insider trading on stock liquidity. 5 While some studies conclude that insider trading impairs stock liquidity (Bettis et al., 2000; Cheng et al., 2006) , others show that there is no significant effect of insider trading on stock liquidity (Chung and Charoenwong, 1998; Charoenwong and Chung, 2000; Cao et al., 2004 Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that very little market movement is observed when insiders trade and when they report their trades to the SEC. Recently, Cohen et al. (2012) decompose insider trading into routine (i.e., uninformed) and opportunistic (i.e., informed) and show that only the opportunistic trades yield positive abnormal return. However, even in that case the dollar profits realized by the insiders are trivial. measured, especially in high volume markets, because traders employ price-dependent strategies and often choose not to execute their orders entirely. Related, our results point to another distinct selection bias in liquidity measures due to the endogenous timing of the trading strategies of informed investors.
Finally, the paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by showing how activist shareholders benefit from liquid stock markets. Kyle and Vila (1991) , Bolton and von Thadden (1998), and Maug (1998) predict that greater liquidity trading facilitates monitoring and shareholder activism. While recent empirical papers show that stock liquidity facilitates hedge fund activism and proxy contests (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Fos, 2012) , this paper provides direct evidence on the magnitude of these profits. Importantly, in this paper we show that trading strategies of activist shareholders depend on stock liquidity. That is, we provide the micro-level data to support the conjecture that higher stock liquidity benefits activist shareholders who actively intervene in corporate governance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the institutional background. Section 2 describes the data. The magnitude of information asymmetry is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 describes liquidity measures used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the main evidence on the effect of informed trading on liquidity measures. Section 6 documents the effect of exogenous variation in stock liquidity on trading strategies of Schedule 13D filers. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Institutional Background
In this section we summarize the institutional background and describe what information we exploit in empirical tests. Rule 13d-1(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act requires investors to file with the SEC within 10 days of acquiring more than 5% of any class of securities of a publicly traded company if they have an interest in influencing 7 the management of the company.
6
Item 5(c) of Schedule 13D requires the filer to "... describe any transactions in the class of securities reported on that were effected during the past sixty days or since the most recent filing of Schedule 13D, whichever is less." Importantly, we restrict our sample to original Schedule 13D filings only, i.e., amendments to previously submitted filings are excluded from the sample (this maximizes the 'asymmetric information' content of the trades by the insider). Thus, our Schedule 13D filings reveal the date and price for all transactions by the Schedule 13D filer that were executed during sixty days that precede the filing date. Figure 1 presents a typical time line of a Schedule 13 filing.
[Insert Figure 1 here] For each event we extract the following information from the Schedule 13D filings:
CUSIP of the underlying security, date of every transaction, transaction type (purchase or sell), transaction size, and transaction price. In addition, we extract filing date, event date (date of crossing the 5% threshold), and the beneficial ownership of the Schedule 13D filer at the filing date. In the vast majority of cases transaction data are reported at daily frequency. If the transaction data are at higher-than-daily frequency, we aggregate it to the daily level. Specifically, for every day we calculate the total change in stock ownership and the average purchase price. The average price is the quantity-weighted average of transaction prices. 6 In general, an investor who has an interest in influencing the management of the company is required to file Schedule 13D in the following cases: (i) an investor's position exceeds the legal threshold of 5%, (ii) a group of investors decides to act as a legal group and the ownership of the group exceeds the legal threshold of 5%, and (iii) an investor's previously established position changes by more than 1% of stocks outstanding, either positive or negative. This study exploits cases (i) and (ii) only, since the incentive to trade on private information is the strongest when an investor's position exceeds the legal threshold of 5%. The sample is constructed as follows. First, using an automatic search script, we identify 9,580 Schedule 13D filings during 2001-2010. Next, we check the sample of 9,580 filings manually and identify events with information on trades. Since the trading characteristics of ordinary equities might differ from those of other assets, we retain only assets whose CRSP share codes are 10 or 11, i.e., we discard certificates, ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, units, companies incorporated outside the U.S., Americus Trust components, closed-end funds, preferred stocks, and REITs. We exclude stocks whose prices are below $1 and above $1,000. Moreover, we exclude events that involve derivatives, such as options, warrants, and swaps. Finally, we exclude Schedule 13D/A filings (i.e., amendments to previously submitted filings) that are mistakenly classified as original Schedule 13D filings. [Insert Figure 2 here] Next, we examine the trading strategy of Schedule 13D filers. The trading strategy is described using the following three measures, which we describe in detail below: (1) the probability that a Schedule 13D filer trades at least one share on a given day, (2) the percentage of outstanding shares traded by Schedule 13D filers, and (3) the probability of trading with a Schedule 13D filer. Each measure of the trading activity is calculated at daily frequency. Figure 3 presents the cross-event average of each measure for the sixty days prior to the filing date, plotted as a function of the distance to the filing day.
[Insert Figure 3 here] For every distance to the filing day, the probability that a Schedule 13D filer trades at least one share is the number of filings with a non-zero trade by the filer divided by the total number of Schedule 13D filings in the sample. Figure 3 indicates that the probability that a Schedule 13D filer trades at least one share on a given day is approximately 30% and it reaches a 50% level closer to the filing day.
To further understand the trading strategy of Schedule 13D filers, we calculate the percentage of outstanding shares traded by Schedule 13D filers. For every distance to the filing day, the percentage of outstanding shares traded by Schedule 13D filers is the ratio of the number of shares traded by the Schedule 13D filer to the number of total shares outstanding. Figure 3 suggests that a Schedule 13D filer gradually increases the percentage of outstanding shares purchased on every trading day. Closer to the filing day Schedule 13D filers trade more aggressively. For example, the average percentage of outstanding shares purchased on every trading day by the Schedule 13D filers increases from 0.03%-0.07% to 0.2%-0.3% closer to the filing day.
Finally, we observe that the probability of trading with a Schedule 13D filer comoves with the percentage of outstanding shares purchased by Schedule 13D filers. For every distance to the filing day, the probability of trading with Schedule 13D filer is the cross-event average of the number of shares traded by the filer divided by the security's volume from CRSP. If no trade is reported on a given day by the filer, the percentage of outstanding shares traded by the filer is set to zero. The probability of facing an informed trader in a transaction increases dramatically from 5% to 10%-15% level when approaching the filing day.
Summary statistics of trading strategies adopted by Schedule 13D filers are reported in Table 1 . Columns (1) and (4) report summary statistics of all reported trades. The average (median) stock ownership on the filing date is 7.68% (6.20%). The average (median) filer purchases 3.8% (2.8%) of outstanding shares during sixty-day period prior to the filing date. It corresponds to an average (median) purchase of 1,304,126 (393,387) shares at average (median) cost of $25.6 ($3.3) million. On days with non-zero informed volume the filer purchases 0.5% (0.2%) of outstanding shares.
[Insert Table 1 here] The summary statistics of trades executed by Schedule 13D filers during the pre-event days are reported in columns (2) and (4) To summarize, the evidence suggests that (1) Schedule 13D filers do not trade every day (but rather every two or three days), (2) when they trade, they trade a relatively large fraction of the daily volume (around one quarter of the daily volume), (3) Schedule 13D filers trade more aggressively closer to the filing date.
In our sample, 65% of companies are listed on the NASDAQ, 27% are listed on the NYSE, and the remaining 8% are listed on the AMEX. Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) suggest that there is a difference in the degree of anonymity between NASDAQ and NYSE market structures. Specifically, they find evidence that is consistent with less anonymity on the NYSE specialist system compared to the NASDAQ dealer system. (2003), we find that Schedule 13D filers trade more aggressively on the NASDAQ. For example, when Schedule 13D filers target companies listed on the NASDAQ, the average trading strategy is shorter (15 trading days on the NASDAQ vs. 17 trading days on the NYSE), filers purchase more shares on every trading date (0.57% of outstanding shares on the NASDAQ vs. 0.30% of outstanding shares on the NYSE), and end up with a larger block (7.61% on NASDAQ vs. 7.00% on NYSE).
Consistently with Garfinkel and Nimalendran

Case Study: Icahn Capital LP vs. Chesapeake Energy Corporation
To illustrate the informed trades that are the focus of this paper, we give a detailed description of one specific case. 
On
Are Schedule 13D filers informed?
At the core of this study is the following assumption: Schedule 13D filers possess valuable information on the underlying securities when they trade in the preannouncement period. We use three approaches to assess the extent of the filer's private information. First, we use short-term announcement event-day returns upon Schedule 13D filing. The short-term announcement event-day returns summarize the market's perception of the value created by Schedule 13D filers. Second, we use profits made by Schedule 13D filers on purchasing stocks at the pre-announcement prices. Finally, we evaluate the performance of trading strategies that replicate trades of Schedule 13D
filers.
Note that Schedule 13D filers trade on long-lived information that, by its very nature,
is not likely to be available to other market participants. In most cases, it is their own future actions, such as shareholder activism, that will increase the value of the firm. Of course, this depends closely on their decision, and ability, to take a sizable stake in the firm. In some sense, it is their very trading that constitutes the private information.
Only when they reach the 5% threshold, does the information, due to the disclosure requirement, become public. We can measure the extent to which the market believes their future action have value by looking at announcement returns. This also allows us to measure the private information content of their trades. sample period. There is a run-up of about 7% between sixty days to one day prior to the filing day. The two-day jump in excess return observed at the filing date is around 3%. After that the excess return remains positive and so that the post-filing 'drift'
Announcement Returns
cumulates to a total of 13%. 9 Thus, the short-term announcement event-day returns suggest that Schedule 13D filers indeed possess valuable private information during the pre-announcement period.
[Insert Figure 5 here] By studying the abnormal returns around the filing day we implicitly assume that Schedule 13D filings become public when filed with the SEC. While the 3% two-day jump in excess return observed at the filing date is consistent with this assumption, to further validate it we checked a representative sample of events 'by hand' and found that most of the Schedule 13D filings become public within one day after filing with the SEC. There are, however, some exceptions in the early part of the sample when filings later part of the sample. Specifically, there is no trend in the abnormal return after the filing date. Therefore, the overall evidence suggests that market participants learn almost immediately about Schedule 13D filings in recent years, and also incorporate the resulting information about the stock price fairly efficiently into prices.
Profits
We calculate three measures of profits. First, we calculate Schedule 13D filers' profits from purchasing shares at the pre-announcement prices:
where q is the vector of trades (purchases are positive and sales are negative) during the sixty-day period, p post is the post-announcement price, and p is the vector of transaction prices. The post-announcement price is the average stock price during the week that follows the Schedule 13D filing.
If Schedule 13D filers indeed own valuable private information, they would be expected to purchase shares at a discount relative to the post-announcement price. Of course, by purchasing securities schedule 13D filers may also push up prices. Thus their cumulative profits also depend on the price impact of their trades. If price impact is large, then we expect realized profits of insiders to be lower than if price impact is low.
Thus the trading profits of Schedule 13D filers depend both on the value of their private information and on the stock price liquidity.
Second, we calculate the total profit realized by informed investors:
where p 0 is the price of the first transaction and w 0 is the initial ownership, which is established before the sixty-day period. This measure assumes that a Schedule 13D filer purchases the initial stake at the price of the first transaction. As our case study on "Icahn vs. Cheasapeake" suggests, this assumption is most likely to cause a downward bias in estimated total profits.
Finally, we report the total value created for the shareholders of a company that experience a Schedule 13D filing:
where SHOU T is the number of shares outstanding.
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 2 presents the distribution of trading profits. We split the sample into five market cap quantiles and report mean and median profit measures for every quantile.
The evidence suggests that informed traders profit significantly from trading. For example, a Schedule 13D filer who acquires a $30 million stake in a $404 million market cap company (i.e., 7.42% stake, which is an average stake in our sample) expects to benefit $1.13 million. This can be further broken down into a $0.60 million profit on trades during the sixty-day period and a $0.53 million profit on the initial ownership, purchased prior to the sixty-day window.
The evidence also suggests that the main beneficiaries are shareholders who own shares on the announcement date. For example, shareholders of companies in the fifth market cap quantile gain $46.2 million during an average event whereas the Schedule 13D filer gains $3.0 million. Therefore, while Schedule 13D filers benefit from uninformed traders who sell their shares during the pre-announcement period, they create significant value for all other shareholders by deciding to file Schedule 13D and to intervene in a company's governance.
Trading Strategies
Next we evaluate the performance of trading strategies that exploit the information from Schedule 13D filings. Note that some of these strategies are not implementable based only on public information and without the knowledge of the insider's information or trading. The results are nevertheless interesting to measure the quality of (and returns to) private information. Table 3 reports estimates of one-, three-, and four-factor models,
where the left-hand-side variable is a daily return on the portfolio of Schedule 13D stocks.
[Insert Table 3 We assume that Schedule 13D filers do not change their position until 30 days after the filing date. The evidence suggests that this portfolio exhibits economically and statistically significant positive alpha. For example, the four-factor model daily alpha is 0.09% with 3.04 t-statistic.
The evidence suggests that the informational advantage of Schedule 13D filers is substantial, and that taken together a strategy that could replicate their investments would be extraordinarily successful at generating 'alpha,' i.e., outperforming significantly the benchmark return predicted by standard linear asset-pricing factor models.
Liquidity Measures
We use four measures of stock liquidity that rely on high-frequency data: the Kyle lambda, the effective spread, the realized spread, and price impact. Kyle's lambda is a measure of price impact, which can be interpreted as the cost of demanding a certain amount of liquidity over some given time period. In constructing this measure, we follow
Hasbrouck (2009) and Goyenko et al. (2009) and calculate the price impact as the slope coefficient λ it in the regression:
where for the nth five-minute period on date t and stock i, ret itn is the stock return and S itn is the sum of signed square-root dollar volume, that is, k sign(dvol itnk ) |dvol itnk |.
The trades are signed according to the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
The effective spread is the difference between the natural logarithm of the actual transaction price and the natural logarithm of the midpoint prevailing at the time of the trade:
where P itk is the price of the kth trade and M itk is the midpoint of the consolidated BBO prevailing at the time of the kth trade (Hasbrouck, 2010). 10 Aggregating over day t, a stock's effective spread espread it is the dollar-volume-weighted average of the effective spread espread itk computed over all trades on day t. The wider the effective spread, the less liquid is the stock.
The realized spread is the temporary component of the effective spread. It measures the revenue to liquidity providers assuming that the liquidity provider is able to close her position at the midpoint prevailing five minutes after the trade. For a given stock i 10 We exclude NBBO crossed and locked observations from the analysis (Holden and Jacobsen, 2011) .
and day t, the realized spread on the kth trade is defined as:
where M itk+5 is the midpoint of the consolidated BBO prevailing five-minutes after the kth trade and q itk is the buy-sell indicator (+1 for buys, -1 for sells). Aggregating over day t, a stock's realized spread rspread it is the dollar-volume-weighted average of the realized spread rspread itk computed over all trades on day t.
The five-minute price impact is the permanent component of the effective spread.
It measures gross losses to liquidity demanders due to adverse selection (Glosten and Harris, 1988). For a given stock i and day t, the five-minute price impact of the kth trade is defined as:
Aggregating over day t, a stock's price impact pimpact it is the dollar-volume-weighted average of price impact pimpact itk computed over all trades on day t.
In addition, we use seven low-frequency measures of stock liquidity: the Amihud illiquidity, the Amivest liquidity, the daily bid-ask spread, an indicator of a day with zero return ("zero"), an indicator of a positive-volume day with zero return ("zero2"), the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) reversal measure, and the probability of informed trade ("pin") introduced by Easley et al. (1996) .
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Amihud's illiquidity measure illiquidity it is defined as:
where r it is the stock i return on day t and volume it is stock i dollar volume on day t.
A smaller value of illiquidity implies a lower price impact, and therefore a higher stock liquidity.
The Amivest liquidity measure liquidity it is defined as:
A larger value of liquidity implies a lower price impact.
The bid-ask spread basperad it of stock i on day t is defined as:
where ask it and bid it are daily closing ask and bid from CRSP. A smaller value of baspread implies a higher stock liquidity.
The Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) reversal measure for stock i in period t (e.g., month) is the ordinary least squares estimate of γ i,t in the regression
where quantities are defined as follows: r i,d,t is the return on stock i on day d in period t; r 
12 We follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) in imposing restrictions on the estimation procedure.
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where α is the probability of an information event, µ is the arrival rate of of traders who know the new information if it exists, and ε is the arrival rate of uninformed traders.
Maximum likelihood estimators of these parameters are described in Easley et al. (1996) , pages 1412-1414. A higher value of pin implies a higher probability of informed trade. [Insert Table 4 here]
Results
The evidence reported in Section 3 suggests that Schedule 13D filers indeed possess valuable private information and benefit from trading with uniformed traders. Thus, we can confidently argue that there is a substantial amount of asymmetric information in Schedule 13D trades. Therefore, it is an ideal environment for testing whether liquidity measures indicate the increase in the information asymmetry between market participants. In this section we test whether liquidity measures, described in Section 4, indicate the presence of informed trading.
Price Impact of Informed Trades
We begin the analysis by showing that trades by Schedule 13D filers affect prices.
First, note from figure 5 that stock prices increase closer to the filing date. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that Schedule 13D filers trade more aggressively closer to the filing date.
This suggests that trades by Schedule 13D filers affect prices and specifically, that when Schedule 13D filers buy stocks, their prices appreciate and get closer to the post-filing date level.
Second, we compare the market-adjusted returns and the daily turnover during the sixty-day disclosure period and the sixty-day period during previous year. Panel A in Table 5 suggests that the market-adjusted returns and the daily turnover are higher 21 during the sixty-day disclosure period. The changes are not only statistically but also economically significant. For example, the market adjusted return increases from 0.02% to 0.11%.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Third, Panel B in Table 5 suggests that market-adjusted returns and daily turnover are higher on days when Schedule 13D filers trade. For example, the average marketadjusted return is 0.62% on days when Schedule 13D filers trade and -0.04% on days when Schedule 13-D filer do not trade. Thus, the adverse selection is worse on days when Schedule 13D filers trade.
Finally, we adopt the regression methodology and estimate the following regression:
where y it is either market-adjusted return or daily turnover for company i on day t and itrade it is an indicator that is +1 on a day with trades by Schedule 13D filers and zero else. Table 6 reports the results.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Similarly to evidence in Table 5 , Table 6 suggests that market-adjusted returns and daily turnover are higher on days when Schedule 13D filers trade. The results are robust to augmenting the regression with event fixed effects and restricting the sample to the sixty-day disclosure period only.
Overall, the evidence indicates that when Schedule 13D filers trade they move prices up. In addition, days with trades by Schedule 13D filers are characterized by high daily turnover. Next we study whether liquidity measures reveal the presence of informed trading.
Do Liquidity Measure Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?
We begin the analysis by plotting the two arguably most popular (il)liquidity measures around the filing date: the Kyle (1985) lambda and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Figure 6 shows that both lambda and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure achieve local minima around the filing date. That is, it is exactly when the informed traders are most active and affect prices, these measures indicate low adverse selection.
[Insert Figure 6 here] Next, we consider the sixty-day disclosure period and test whether liquidity measures during this period differ from liquidity measures during the same calendar window in the year prior to that when the Schedule 13D is filed. Importantly, while some liquidity measure are affected not only by adverse selection (e.g., baspread may also be a function of inventory costs), λ and pin are usually associated specifically with the adverse selection component. Therefore, the evidence presented in Table 7 constitutes a major challenge to the argument that these liquidity measures detect informed trades.
[Insert Table 7 
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[Insert Table 8 here]
Next, we adopt the regression methodology and estimate the following regression:
where liq it is a measure of liquidity for company i on day t and itrade it is an indicator that is +1 on a day with trades by Schedule 13D filers and zero else.
16
Panel A in Table 9 reports the results. First note the constant in this specification has a simple interpretation: it measures the average level of a liquidity measure during the sample period, which is (f day − 120, f day + 40) around the filing day. For example, the average effective spread is 112 basis points. The coefficient of itrade indicates how 14 This approach does not allow us to study two liquidity measures that have played a significant role in the literature: the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) gamma and Easley et al. (1996) pin measure. This is because the estimation of these two measures requires a time series of a certain length, and cannot be performed on adjacent days. For example, it is typically suggested to estimate the pin measure over at least a one month horizon.
15 Motivated by the more aggressive trading strategy of Schedule 13D filers in the post-event period, we test how liquidity measures behave on post-event trading days when Schedule 13D filers trade compared to days where they do not trade, during the disclosure period. Untabulated evidence is very similar to evidence from Table 8 , suggesting that all liquidity measures except zero and rspread (which are not statistically significantly different on both types of days) indicate higher stock liquidity on days with trades by Schedule 13D filers during the post-event period.
16 Hendershott et al. (2011) use similar specification to study the effect of algorithmic trading on liquidity.
24 different a measure of liquidity is on days with trades by Schedule 13D filers. The estimates suggest a higher stock liquidity on days with trades by Schedule 13D filers.
All results are highly economically and statistically significant. For example, the price impact decreases by 12 basis points from 62 to 50 basis points, which is a 19% reduction.
None of the liquidity measures, including those that have often being used to proxy for adverse selection, indicate the presence of informed trades.
[Insert Table 9 here] Next we estimate an augmented version of equation (14), which accommodates event fixed effects: In a robustness check we restricted the sample to the (f day − 60, f day) period. The idea of this exercise it to verify that results are not driven by changes in liquidity in the post-filing period. The evidence in Panel C suggests that results are almost unaffected by changing the sample period.
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To summarize, the evidence constitutes a major challenge to the idea that empirical measures of stock price liquidity, and, in particular, of adverse selection, reveal the presence of informed trading. Instead, we find that measures of stock liquidity appear better (i.e., measured adverse selection is smaller) when informed investors trade more aggressively. Importantly, the results are similar when either high-or low-frequency measures of stock liquidity are considered.
Aggregate Return and Liquidity
To shed more light on the selection mechanism that drives the results, we study the effect of exogenous variation in stock liquidity on trading strategies of Schedule 13D filers. which is precisely when informed investors choose to trade more (and therefore more private information is incorporated into prices). Consistently with this intuition, Figure   7 suggests that Schedule 13D filers trade more aggressively when uninformed trading activity is high.
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[Insert Figure 7 here]
We next show how variation in market-wide conditions, such aggregate volume and market return, affects the trading strategies of Schedule 13D filers. Specifically, we
18 Note that our regression regression results above say nothing about causality. It could be that insiders select to trade when stocks happen to be more liquid. Or it could be that stocks appear more liquid because insiders trade more and somehow affect stock liquidity. The latter is, in a way, the argument put forth by Cornell and Sirri (1992) who argue that there are 'falsely informed' noise traders who are attracted by informed trading and therefore offer better liquidity to the insiders (see page 1054). Below we offer some support that, if at all correct, this is not the whole story, since insiders do seem to condition on market wide liquidity, which is unlikely to be caused by their own trading.
19 We separate to total trading volume for every trading day into two components: informed (initiated by Schedule 13D filers) and uninformed (not initiated by Schedule 13D filers).
estimate the following regression:
where pdvol is the percentage deviation of CRSP volume from its previous year average and mktrf is the value-weight market return in excess of the risk-free rate. The analysis is based on daily observations from 60 days before the filing day to the filing day.
Panel A in Table 10 reports the results. The evidence suggests that Schedule 13D filers are more likely to trade when aggregate market activity is high (high CRSP volume), when the market performs poorly (low market return), and when measured liquidity is high. For robustness, we augment equation (16) with event fixed effects, which control for any event-specific unobservables. Panel B reports estimates and suggests that the results are not driven by unobservable event-specific factors.
[Insert Table 10 here]
Conclusion
In this paper we exploit a hand-collected data set on stock transactions by Schedule 13D filers. We find substantial evidence that trades by Schedule 13D filers contain valuable information: both announcement returns and profits realized by the filers are substantial. Moveover, we show that when Schedule 13D filers trade, prices do move up. We therefore feel warranted classifying pre-filing trades by Schedule 13D filers as informed trades.
The data set allows us to test whether stock price liquidity measures, proposed in the literature, reveal the presence of informed traders. The evidence suggests that neither high-frequency nor low-frequency measures of stock liquidity indicate the presence of informed traders. Instead, stocks exhibit higher stock liquidity when informed market participants trade, and even more so when they trade more aggressively. Importantly, measures that have been used as direct proxies for adverse selection, suggest that the 27 adverse selection is lower when informed trading takes place. The evidence is consistent with informed traders being more aggressive in regimes with higher stock 'liquidity.'
The main implication of the paper is that we cannot use standard liquidity measures as proxies for information asymmetry. The main problem seems to be that these measures are not robust to the informed trader's ability to select when and how much to trade. We show that along with liquidity measures, Schedule 13D filers use market volume and market return to condition their timing and size of trades. The event day is the day on which Schedule 13D filer's ownership crosses the 5% threshold. Within ten days after the event day the filer files with the SEC and the filing day is determined. The filing includes information on trades during the sixty-day period that precedes the filing day ("sixty-day disclosure period"). The solid line (right axis) plots the probability that a Schedule 13D filer trades at least one share on a given day. For every distance to the filing day, t − τ , the probability that a Schedule 13D filer trades at least one share is the number of filings with a non-zero trade by the filer divided by the total number of Schedule 13D filings in the sample. We define the distance to the filing day as the number of days between a trading day, τ , and the filing day, t. The filing day corresponds to the day of filing with the SEC. The dark bars (left axis) represent the percentage of outstanding shares traded by Schedule 13D filers, from 60 days prior to the filing day. For every Schedule 13D filing and distance to the filing day, t − τ , we calculate the percentage of outstanding shares traded by the filer as the ratio between the number of shares traded by the filer and the number of shares outstanding. If no trade is reported on a given day by the filer, the percentage of outstanding shares traded by the filer is set to zero. Then, for every distance to the filing day, t − τ , the percentage of outstanding shares traded by Schedule 13D filers is the average of the percentage of outstanding shares traded among all filings. The dashed line (right axis) plots the probability of trading with a Schedule 13D filer. For every distance to the filing day, t − τ , the probability of trading with a Schedule 13D filer is the average of the number of shares traded by the filer divided by security's volume from CRSP. The solid line (right axis) plots the average buy-and-hold return around the filing date in excess of the buy-and-hold return of the value-weight market from 60 days prior the filing day to 40 days afterwards. The filing day is the day on which the Schedule 13D filing is submitted to the SEC. The dark bars (left axis) plot the increase (in percentage points) in the share turnover during the same time window compared to the average turnover rate during the preceding (t-120, t-60) event window. (4)- (6) report cross-event medians of characteristics. Columns (1) and (4) report descriptive statistics from the full sample, which covers all days with informed trades during the sixty-day period before the filing day. The filing day is the day on which the Schedule 13D filing is submitted to the SEC. Columns (2) and (5) report descriptive statistics from days with informed trades during the pre-event day period ('Before'). The event day is the day on which filer's ownership exceeds the 5% threshold. Columns (3) and (6) ,270,457 844,707 Q2 63,368,069 90,877 26,025 197,147 59,418 1,819,414 1,828,604 Q3 151,542,849 308,514 65,642 369,945 291,283 6,626,805 5,969,746 Q4 404,095,821 568,519 124,864 1,133,935 307,943 19,634,771 8,424,417 Q5 -high 1,818,551,960 1,434,720 586,761 2,982,360 1,501,983 46,216,662 28,635,234 Transactions. This table presents evidence on performance of portfolios that replicate trades by Schedule 13D filers. Panel A reports performance of an equal-weighted portfolio return, which is constructed as follows. For every trading day, we calculate the equal-weighted average of returns on stocks held by Schedule 13D filers. We report results for three investment horizons: from 90 days before filing to 30 days after filing, from 60 days before filing to 30 days after filing, and from 30 days before filing to 30 days after filing. Panel B reports the performance of a portfolio-weighted return, which is constructed as follows. For every trading day, we calculate the dollar investment of Schedule 13D filers in the underlying security. Then we calculate the average return on stocks held by Schedule 13D filers for every trading date, where the weights are proportional to the dollar investment in each security. The trading strategy starts with the first disclosed transaction. We assume that Schedule 13D filers do not change their position during 30 days that follow the filing date. filers. The data set combines TAQ, CRSP, and the hand-collected sample of Schedule 13D filings (see Section 2). Market-adjusted return (eret) is the stock return in excess of the CRSP value-weighted return. Daily turnover (to) is daily volume divided by the number of shares outstanding. Panel A compares level of market-adjusted returns and daily turnover during the sixty-day disclosure period, (f day − 60, f day − 1), and the corresponding sixty-day period of the year before the Schedule 13D filing, (f day − 420, f day − 361). First, for every Schedule 13D filing we calculate the average level of market-adjusted returns and daily turnover during the sixty-day disclosure period, (f day − 60, f day − 1). Then, we calculate the average level of market-adjusted returns and daily turnover among all events. Column (1) reports the average level of marketadjusted returns and daily turnover during the sixty-day disclosure period among all events. Similarly, Column (2) reports the average level of market-adjusted returns and daily turnover during the corresponding sixty-day period of the year before the Schedule 13D filing, (f day−420, f day−361). Column (3) reports the differences between columns (1) and (2). Column (4) reports the t-statistic of the difference. Panel B compares level of market-adjusted returns and daily turnover during on days when Schedule 13D filers trade and on days when Schedule 13D filers do not trade. The sample covers the sixty-day disclosure period only. First, for every Schedule 13D filing we calculate the average level of market-adjusted returns and daily turnover during the sixty-day disclosure period on days with trades by the Schedule 13D filer. Column (1) reports the average level of market-adjusted returns and daily turnover on days with trades by Schedule 13D filers among all events. Column (2) reports the average level of market-adjusted returns and daily turnover on days with no trades by Schedule 13D filers during the sixty-day disclosure period. Column (3) reports the differences between columns (1) and (2). Column (4) reports the t-statistic of the difference. Panel C .. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. (3)) and daily turnover (columns (4)-(6)) on indicator of informed trading, using the following specification: y it = α+γitrade it + it , where y it is either market-adjusted return or daily turnover for company i on day t, and itrade indicates days on which Schedule 13D filers trade. Columns (1) and (4) reports results based on daily observations from 120 days before the filing day to 40 days after the filing day, where the filing day is the day on which the Schedule 13D filing is submitted to the SEC. Columns (2) and (5) report estimates of a specification augmented by event fixed effects: y it = α+γitrade it +η i + it , where η i are event fixed effects. Columns (3) and (6) report results with events fixed effects based of daily observations from 60 days before the filing day to the filing day.
In each column, we report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics, calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Table 7 : Liquidity Measures during the Sixty-Day Disclosure Period. This table reports the summary statistics of liquidity measures during the sixty-day disclosure period and the corresponding sixty-day period during the year before the Schedule 13D filing. The data set combines TAQ, CRSP, and the hand-collected sample of Schedule 13D filings (see Section 2). All liquidity measures are defined in Section 4 and are 99.9% winsorized. Market-adjusted return (eret) is the stock return in excess of the CRSP value-weighted return. Daily turnover (to) is daily volume divided by the number of shares outstanding. For every Schedule 13D filing we calculate the average level of a liquidity measure during the sixty-day disclosure period, (f day − 60, f day − 1). Column (1) reports the average level of liquidity measures during the sixty-day disclosure period among all events. Similarly, Column (2) reports the average level of liquidity measures during the corresponding sixty-day period of the year before the Schedule 13D filing, (f day − 420, f day − 361). Column (3) reports the differences between columns (1) and (2). Column (4) reports the t-statistic of the difference. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
(fday-60,fday-1) (fday-420,fday-361) difference t-stat (1) (2) reports the average level of liquidity measures on days with no trades by Schedule 13D filers during the sixty-day disclosure period. Column (3) reports the differences between columns (1) and (2). Column (4) reports the t-statistic of the difference. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. while restricting the sample to daily observations from 60 days before the filing day to the filing day. In each column, we report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics, calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
(8)
Panel A itrade -2.4077*** -0.0023*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.1352*** 14.5902*** -0.0023*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** we report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics, calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A pdvol 0.0424***
